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Access	Internalism	and	the	Extended	Mind	Declan	Smithies		 Forthcoming	in	Extended	Epistemology,	Oxford	University	Press	Edited	by	A.	Carter,	A.	Clark,	J.	Kallestrup,	O.	Palermos,	and	D.	Pritchard		Is	internalism	in	epistemology	compatible	with	externalism	in	philosophy	of	mind?	The	question	is	worth	asking	because	the	labels	‘internalism’	and	‘externalism’	have	different	meanings	in	epistemology	and	philosophy	of	mind.	But	the	issue	is	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	these	labels	can	be	used	in	several	different	ways	even	within	each	of	these	areas.	Internalism	in	epistemology	can	mean	either	mentalism	or	accessibilism.	Mentalism	is	the	thesis	that	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe	supervenes	upon	one’s	mental	states.	Accessibilism	is	the	thesis	that	one	has	privileged	epistemic	access	to	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe.	Neither	mentalism	nor	accessibilism	logically	entails	the	other:	these	two	claims	can	be	combined	as	parts	of	a	larger	package,	but	either	one	can	be	consistently	held	without	the	other.1	Externalism	in	philosophy	of	mind	can	mean	either	content	externalism	or	
vehicle	externalism.	Content	externalism	is	the	thesis	that	some	mental	states	have	their	contents	in	virtue	of	relations	to	the	external	environment.	Vehicle	externalism	is	the	thesis	that	some	mental	states	–	that	is,	vehicles	of	mental	content	–	are	partially	constituted	by	features	of	the	external	environment.	Again,	neither	content	externalism	nor	vehicle	externalism	logically	entails	the	other.2																																																									1	The	terms	‘mentalism’	and	‘accessibilism’	are	from	Conee	and	Feldman	2001.	See	Conee	and	Feldman	2001	for	mentalism	without	accessibilism,	Gibbons	2006	for	accessibilism	without	mentalism,	and	Smithies	2014	for	the	combination	of	mentalism	and	accessibilism.	2	The	term	‘vehicle	externalism’	is	from	Hurley	1998.	Burge	1986:	13-18	combines	content	externalism	with	vehicle	internalism:	beliefs	are	constituted	by	neural	states	but	have	their	contents	in	virtue	of	relations	to	the	external	environment.	Clark	and	Chalmers	1998:	14,	n.	4	combine	vehicle	externalism	with	content	
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The	question	whether	epistemic	internalism	is	compatible	with	content	externalism	has	been	widely	discussed.	In	contrast,	the	question	whether	epistemic	internalism	is	compatible	with	vehicle	externalism	has	been	largely	neglected	until	recently.3	This	is	perhaps	not	surprising	given	that	content	externalism	emerged	in	the	1970s,	whereas	vehicle	externalism	did	not	emerge	until	the	1990s.	Even	so,	the	time	is	ripe	for	addressing	the	second	question.	First,	though,	we	need	to	clarify	what	kind	of	epistemic	internalism	we	are	talking	about.	It	seems	quite	clear	that	mentalism	is	compatible	with	vehicle	externalism	so	long	as	the	mental	states	on	which	justification	supervenes	can	be	partially	constituted	by	the	environment.	A	more	interesting	question	is	whether	accessibilism	is	compatible	with	vehicle	externalism.	That	is	the	target	question	for	this	chapter.	The	main	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	argue	that	accessibilism	is	incompatible	with	vehicle	externalism.	As	we	shall	see,	however,	there	are	strong	arguments	for	both	of	these	positions.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	a	compelling	argument	for	vehicle	externalism:	the	parity	argument	from	Clark	and	Chalmers	1998.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	a	compelling	argument	for	accessibilism:	the	Moorean	argument	from	Smithies	2012.	If	accessibilism	is	incompatible	with	vehicle	externalism,	then	both	arguments	cannot	be	sound.	I	resolve	the	tension	by	arguing	that	the	Moorean	argument	succeeds,	while	the	parity	argument	fails,	and	hence	that	vehicle	externalism	should	be	rejected	on	broadly	epistemological	grounds.	Here	is	the	plan	for	the	paper.	Section	1	presents	the	parity	argument	for	vehicle	externalism.	Section	2	presents	the	Moorean	argument	for	accessibilism.	Section	3	presents	a	new	argument	that	accessibilism	is	incompatible	with	vehicle	externalism.	Sections	4-6	defend	the	premises	of	this	argument	against	objections.	Section	7	explains	why	the	parity	argument	for	vehicle	externalism	fails	and	draws	some	more	general	lessons	about	functionalism	and	the	mind.	Section	8	concludes.																																																																																																																																																																							internalism:	beliefs	have	“notional”	contents	in	virtue	of	features	that	are	internal	to	a	cognitive	system	that	is	extended	into	the	external	world.	3	See	Carter,	Kallestrup,	Palermos	and	Pritchard	2014	for	an	overview	of	the	current	state	of	the	literature	on	both	questions.	See	also	Carter	and	Palermos	2015	for	a	recent	discussion	of	the	second	question.	
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1. Extended	Cognition	I	will	focus	my	discussion	on	the	version	of	vehicle	externalism	proposed	by	Andy	Clark	and	David	Chalmers	in	their	groundbreaking	paper,	“The	Extended	Mind”.	They	argue	that	beliefs	can	be	extended	in	the	sense	that	they	are	constituted	in	part	by	aspects	of	the	external	environment	that	play	the	right	kind	of	functional	role	in	a	subject’s	cognitive	processes.	I’ll	call	this	the	extended	cognition	thesis.	Here	is	an	official	statement	of	the	thesis	from	the	original	paper:		
The	extended	cognition	thesis:	“beliefs	can	be	constituted	partly	by	features	of	the	environment,	when	those	features	play	the	right	sort	of	role	in	driving	cognitive	processes.”	(Clark	and	Chalmers	1998:	12)		I’ll	begin	by	clarifying	the	thesis	before	presenting	the	central	argument	for	it.	First,	this	is	a	thesis	about	cognition	as	distinct	from	its	computational	underpinnings.	As	I	use	the	term,	cognition	is	distinguished	from	mere	computation	by	the	fact	that	it	is	subject	to	epistemic	evaluation.	By	this	criterion,	cognition	includes	doxastic	states	of	belief	and	doxastic	processes	of	belief	revision,	but	it	excludes	the	subdoxastic	states	and	processes	that	figure	in	computational	explanations	in	cognitive	science.	Second,	this	is	a	thesis	about	cognition	as	distinct	from	consciousness.	Clark	and	Chalmers	concede	that	it	is	“far	from	plausible	that	consciousness	extends	outside	the	head”	(1998:	10).	But	cognition	may	be	extended	even	if	consciousness	is	not.	Moreover,	this	is	compatible	with	fairly	strong	connections	between	consciousness	and	cognition.	Following	Clark	and	Chalmers,	I	will	assume	that	beliefs	are	standing	dispositional	states,	rather	than	occurrent	events	in	the	stream	of	consciousness.	But	this	is	consistent	with	(although	it	does	not	require)	the	view	that	beliefs	are	dispositions	to	cause	occurrent	events	of	consciously	thinking	or	judging	the	contents	that	one	believes.	Third,	Clark	and	Chalmers	argue	for	the	possibility	of	extended	cognition,	but	they	do	not	argue	–	at	least,	not	in	the	original	paper	–	that	this	possibility	is	actual.	Their	argument	is	based	on	consideration	of	counterfactual	examples,	rather	than	
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actual	ones	–	in	particular,	the	example	of	Inga	and	Otto	discussed	below.	But	if	their	argument	is	sound,	then	it	has	the	potential	to	be	extended	to	actual	examples.	Clark	(2011)	argues	for	this	extension	in	some	detail.	Finally,	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	more	controversial	than	the	thesis	that	beliefs	can	have	an	extracranial	location	and	a	non-neural	basis.4	Given	the	commitment	to	multiple	realizability,	many	functionalists	would	accept	that	beliefs	can	be	realized	by	implanting	silicon	chips	in	the	brain	or	by	wiring	them	up	to	the	brain	remotely.	Even	so,	it	is	much	more	controversial	that	beliefs	can	have	an	extracranial	location	and	a	non-neural	basis	just	by	playing	the	kind	of	functional	role	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays	in	Clark	and	Chalmers’	example.	One	can	deny	that	Otto’s	notebook	realizes	extended	beliefs	without	thereby	ruling	out	the	possibility	of	more	remote	science-fiction	scenarios	in	which	beliefs	have	an	extracranial	location	and	a	non-neural	basis.	Let	us	turn	now	to	the	key	example	of	Inga	and	Otto.	Clark	and	Chalmers	describe	the	case	as	follows:		Inga	hears	from	a	friend	that	there	is	an	exhibition	at	the	Museum	of	Modern	Art,	and	decides	to	go	see	it.	She	thinks	for	a	moment	and	recalls	that	the	museum	is	on	53rd	Street,	so	she	walks	to	53rd	Street	and	goes	into	the	museum.	It	seems	clear	that	Inga	believes	that	the	museum	is	on	53rd	Street,	and	that	she	believed	this	even	before	she	consulted	her	memory.	It	was	not	previously	an	occurrent	belief,	but	then	neither	are	most	of	our	beliefs.	The	belief	was	sitting	somewhere	in	memory,	waiting	to	be	accessed.		Now	consider	Otto.	Otto	suffers	from	Alzheimer's	disease,	and	like	many	Alzheimer's	patients,	he	relies	on	information	in	the	environment	to	help	structure	his	life.	Otto	carries	a	notebook	around	with	him	everywhere	he																																																									4	Compare	Farkas	(2012)	for	two	versions	of	the	extended	mind	thesis:	(i)	“the	physical	basis	of	mental	events	can	extend	beyond	the	boundaries	of	our	physical	body”	(2012:	437);	and	(ii)	“the	typical	role	of	standing	states	can	be	extended	to	include	states	that	produce	conscious	manifestations	in	a	somewhat	different	way	than	normal	beliefs	and	desires	do”	(2012:	441).	
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goes.	When	he	learns	new	information,	he	writes	it	down.	When	he	needs	some	old	information,	he	looks	it	up.	For	Otto,	his	notebook	plays	the	role	usually	played	by	a	biological	memory.	Today,	Otto	hears	about	the	exhibition	at	the	Museum	of	Modern	Art,	and	decides	to	go	see	it.	He	consults	the	notebook,	which	says	that	the	museum	is	on	53rd	Street,	so	he	walks	to	53rd	Street	and	goes	into	the	museum.	(1998:	12-13)		Why	do	Inga	and	Otto	walk	to	53rd	St?	According	to	Clark	and	Chalmers,	the	explanation	is	the	same	in	both	cases:	each	of	them	wants	to	go	to	MoMA	and	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	The	key	point	is	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	for	him	that	Inga’s	memory	plays	for	her	–	namely,	combining	with	desire	to	produce	action.	This	is	often	thought	to	be	a	central	role	–	and	perhaps	even	the	central	role	–	in	terms	of	which	belief	is	defined.5	One	might	object	that	Otto	has	no	beliefs	about	the	location	of	MoMA	until	he	consults	his	notebook.	If	so,	then	the	explanation	of	his	behavior	is	more	complicated.	Otto	walks	to	53rd	St	because	he	wants	to	go	to	MoMA,	and	he	believes	that	MoMA	is	located	wherever	it	says	in	the	notebook,	but	he	does	not	believe	that	MoMA	is	located	at	53rd	St	until	he	opens	his	notebook	and	looks	at	it.	Clark	and	Chalmers	reply	that	we	should	avoid	explaining	Otto’s	behavior	in	this	way	because	it	adds	pointless	complexity.	First,	they	argue	that	we	shouldn’t	complicate	the	explanation	in	Otto’s	case	unless	we	do	so	in	Inga’s	case	too.	If	we	say	that	Otto	has	no	belief	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	until	he	consults	his	notebook,	then	we	should	say	that	Inga	has	no	such	belief	until	she	consults	her	memory.	Second,	they	argue	that,	other	things	being	equal,	simpler	explanations	are	better	than	more	complicated	ones:	“In	an	explanation,	simplicity	is	power”	(1998:	13).	If	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	for	him	that	Inga’s	memory	plays	for	her,	then	we	can	argue	that	Otto’s	notebook	realizes	belief	if	Inga’s	memory	does.	Here	is	a	reconstruction	of	the	argument	from	parity:																																																									5	Compare	Stalnaker:	“To	believe	that	P	is	to	be	disposed	to	act	in	ways	that	would	tend	to	satisfy	one’s	desires,	whatever	they	are,	in	a	world	in	which	P	(together	with	one’s	other	beliefs)	were	true”	(1984:	15).	
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	 (1) Anything	that	plays	the	same	role	as	a	belief	is	itself	a	belief.	(2) The	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory	plays	the	right	kind	of	role	to	count	as	belief.	(3) The	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	as	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory.	(4) Therefore,	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	right	kind	of	role	to	count	as	belief.		The	argument	has	three	premises.	I’ll	briefly	consider	each	of	them	in	turn.	The	first	premise	is	a	version	of	what	has	become	known	as	the	parity	
principle.	In	the	first	instance,	Clark	and	Chalmers	define	the	parity	principle	for	cognitive	processes:		 If,	as	we	confront	some	task,	a	part	of	the	world	functions	as	a	process	which,	were	it	to	go	on	in	the	head,	we	would	have	no	hesitation	in	accepting	as	part	of	the	cognitive	process,	then	that	part	of	the	world	is	part	of	the	cognitive	process.	(1998:	8).		To	paraphrase,	if	some	process	plays	the	same	functional	role	as	a	cognitive	process,	then	it	is	a	cognitive	process.	The	same	principle	applies	to	cognitive	states:	if	an	informational	state	plays	the	same	functional	role	as	a	belief,	then	it	is	a	belief.	This	principle	is	motivated	by	a	broadly	functionalist	conception	of	belief,	according	to	which	a	belief	is	an	informational	state	that	plays	the	right	kind	of	functional	role.	As	Clark	and	Chalmers	put	the	point,	“What	makes	some	information	count	as	a	belief	is	the	role	it	plays”	(1998:	14).	One	might	object	that	functionalism	is	false.	But	the	parity	principle	requires	only	a	weak	form	of	functionalism.	There	is	no	commitment	to	functionalism	about	consciousness	as	distinct	from	cognition.	Moreover,	there	is	no	commitment	to	any	specific	account	of	the	functional	role	of	cognition.	For	instance,	the	functional	role	of	belief	might	include,	and	might	even	be	exhausted	by,	its	disposition	to	cause	
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conscious	experiences	of	thinking	and	judging	that	are	immune	from	any	further	functional	analysis.6	One	might	object	that	even	this	weak	form	of	functionalism	is	false.	Thus,	Mark	Sprevak	(2009)	argues	that	the	extended	cognition	thesis	reduces	to	absurdity	the	functionalist	assumptions	that	motivate	the	parity	principle.	But	it	is	hard	to	see	how	this	weak	form	of	functionalism	could	be	false.	What	more	is	needed	for	belief	besides	having	an	informational	state	that	plays	the	right	kind	of	functional	role?	One	might	insist	that	belief	requires	neural	realization	or	intracranial	location,	but	this	conflicts	with	the	plausible	and	widespread	assumption	that	cognition	can	be	multiply	realized.	The	rationale	for	the	second	premise	is	that	if	anyone	believes	anything,	then	Inga	does,	since	a	paradigm	case	of	believing	that	p	is	having	the	information	that	p	stored	in	memory.	One	might	object	that	there	is	no	such	mental	state	as	belief	construed	as	a	standing,	dispositional	state,	rather	than	an	occurrent	event	in	the	stream	of	consciousness.	According	to	Brie	Gertler,	for	instance,	“the	mind	is	made	up	entirely	of	occurrent	states	and	conscious	processes.”	(2007:	203).	There	is	no	room	for	standing,	dispositional	belief	within	this	conception	of	the	mental.	On	this	view,	there	is	parity	between	Otto	and	Inga	because	neither	has	a	mental	state	of	believing	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	On	the	face	of	it,	this	view	is	extremely	revisionary.	The	existence	of	dispositional	belief	is	supported	not	only	by	ordinary	language,	but	also	by	explanatory	and	epistemic	considerations.	Suppose	that	I	open	the	fridge	while	making	my	morning	coffee.	What	explains	my	behavior?	Let’s	stipulate	that	I’m	so	preoccupied	with	my	plans	for	the	day	that	I	don’t	consciously	think	about	what	I’m	doing	at	all.	Even	so,	it	would	be	perfectly	natural	to	say	that	I	open	the	fridge	because	I	want	milk	in	my	coffee	and	I	believe	there	is	milk	in	the	fridge.	It’s	not	only	part	of	common	sense	that	such	belief	ascriptions	are	often	true.	It’s	hard	to	explain	why	I	act	as	I	do,	and	why	my	action	is	rational	or	justified,	without	assuming	that	I	am	acting	on	standing	beliefs	that	are	not	occurrent	in	conscious	experience.																																																									6	See	Schwitzgebel	2002	and	Smithies	2014,	2016	for	versions	of	this	view.	
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The	rationale	for	the	third	premise	is	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	in	explaining	his	behavior	that	Inga’s	memory	plays	in	explaining	hers.	One	might	object	that	there	are	differences	between	Inga	and	Otto	with	regard	to	the	reliability	or	stability	of	their	access	to	stored	information.	For	instance,	Clark	and	Chalmers	note	that	Otto	cannot	access	his	notebook	in	the	shower	or	in	the	dark.	But	they	also	note	that	Inga	cannot	access	her	memory	when	she	is	asleep	or	intoxicated.	Arguably,	then,	parity	remains.	Clark	and	Chalmers	stipulate	that	Otto’s	access	to	his	notebook	is	no	less	stable	or	reliable	than	Inga’s	access	to	her	memory.	Moreover,	they	stipulate	that	it	is	only	under	these	conditions	that	Otto’s	notebook	constitutes	a	belief.	If	his	access	to	the	notebook	is	too	unstable	or	too	unreliable,	then	it	does	not	constitute	a	belief	at	all.	According	to	Clark	and	Chalmers,	the	following	conditions	must	be	satisfied:		 (1) First,	the	notebook	is	a	constant	in	Otto’s	life	–	in	cases	where	the	information	in	the	notebook	would	be	relevant,	he	will	rarely	take	action	without	consulting	it.	(2) Second,	the	information	in	the	notebook	is	directly	available	without	difficulty.	(3) Third,	upon	retrieving	the	information	from	the	notebook	he	automatically	endorses	it.	(4) Fourth,	the	information	in	the	notebook	has	been	consciously	endorsed	at	some	point	in	the	past,	and	indeed	is	there	as	a	consequence	of	this	endorsement.	(1998:	17)		The	fourth	condition	is	controversial	because	it	contains	a	historical	component.	Arguably,	I	can	believe	things	that	I	have	never	endorsed	in	the	past	so	long	as	I	am	now	disposed	to	endorse	them	when	the	question	arises.	But	the	historical	condition	can	be	replaced	with	the	causal	condition	that	information	is	typically	stored	in	the	notebook	whenever	it	is	consciously	endorsed.	
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Even	granting	these	functional	similarities	between	Inga	and	Otto,	one	might	insist	that	there	are	some	functional	differences	that	remain.7	But	the	challenge	is	to	make	the	case	that	these	functional	differences	are	deep	and	important	enough	to	make	for	a	cognitive	difference	between	Inga	and	Otto.	After	all,	Clark	and	Chalmers	can	allow	for	superficial	differences	between	Inga	and	Otto:		 The	differences	between	Otto’s	case	and	Inga’s	are	striking,	but	they	are	superficial.	By	using	the	“belief”	notion	in	a	wider	way,	it	picks	out	something	more	akin	to	a	natural	kind.	The	notion	becomes	deeper	and	more	unified,	and	is	more	useful	in	explanation.	(1998:	14)		As	Sprevak	(2009)	notes,	if	cognition	is	multiply	realizable,	then	we	should	expect	fine-grained	differences	in	functional	role	corresponding	to	differences	in	physical	realization.	So	the	challenge	is	to	make	the	case	that	the	functional	differences	between	Inga	and	Otto	are	coarse-grained	enough	to	make	for	a	cognitive	difference,	rather	than	merely	a	difference	in	how	cognition	is	realized.	One	of	the	aims	of	this	paper	is	to	develop	a	new	response	to	this	challenge.		
2. Accessibilism	Accessibilism	is	the	thesis	that	one	always	has	privileged	access	to	the	facts	about	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe.	There	are	various	different	ways	of	making	this	privileged	access	thesis	more	precise,	but	in	Smithies	2012	I	defined	it	as	a	biconditional	version	of	the	JJ	principle:		
Accessibilism:	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p	if	and	only	if	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p	(Jp	↔	JJp).		According	to	accessibilism,	the	facts	about	which	propositions	one	has	justification	
																																																								7	For	specific	proposals,	see	Adams	and	Aizawa	2001,	Rupert	2004,	Gertler	2007,	Weiskopf	2008,	and	Pearlberg	and	Schroeder	2015.	
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to	believe	are	self-intimating	in	the	sense	that	one	has	higher-level	justification	to	believe	that	they	obtain	whenever	they	do	obtain.	Moreover,	one’s	higher-level	justification	is	infallible	in	the	sense	that	these	justification	facts	obtain	whenever	one	has	higher-level	justification	to	believe	that	they	obtain.	In	that	sense,	one	has	privileged	epistemic	access	to	the	facts	about	justification.	As	I	have	defined	it,	accessibilism	is	a	thesis	about	propositional	justification,	rather	than	doxastic	justification:	it	is	a	thesis	about	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe,	rather	than	which	justified	beliefs	one	has.	Doxastic	justification	requires	propositional	justification,	but	not	vice	versa:	one	can	have	justification	to	believe	a	proposition	that	one	does	not	believe	in	a	way	that	is	justified	or	that	one	does	not	believe	at	all.	Arguably,	one	can	have	justification	to	believe	a	proposition	even	if	one	does	not	have	the	psychological	capacity	to	believe	it	in	a	way	that	is	justified.	For	instance,	one	might	be	too	tired,	too	distracted,	or	just	too	dense	to	believe	whatever	is	justified	by	the	evidence.	This	is	crucial	for	avoiding	some	stock	objections	to	accessibilism.	Accessibilism	does	not	entail	that	having	justified	beliefs	requires	having	justified	higher-order	beliefs	about	those	beliefs.	That	would	rule	out	the	possibility	of	justified	belief	in	children	and	animals	with	a	capacity	for	cognition	but	not	metacognition.	Worse	still,	it	rules	out	the	possibility	of	justified	belief	in	any	finite	agent,	since	having	justified	beliefs	would	require	having	an	infinite	hierarchy	of	justified	higher-level	beliefs	of	infinitely	increasing	complexity.	Since	accessibilism	is	a	thesis	about	propositional	justification,	rather	than	doxastic	justification,	it	does	not	have	these	implausible	consequences.	In	Smithies	2012,	I	argued	for	accessibilism	by	appealing	to	the	absurdity	of	believing	Moorean	conjunctions	of	the	following	forms:		 (1) p	but	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	that	p	(2) p	but	it’s	an	open	question	whether	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p	(3) I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	but	it’s	not	the	case	that	p	(4) I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	but	it’s	an	open	question	whether	p		
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The	argument	takes	the	form	of	a	reductio.	If	accessibilism	is	false,	then	I	can	have	justification	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions	of	these	forms.	Intuitively,	however,	I	cannot	have	justification	to	believe	these	Moorean	conjunctions	because	believing	them	would	be	absurd.	Therefore,	accessibilism	is	true.	Consider	the	left-to-right	direction	first.	If	it	is	false,	then	there	is	a	possible	case	in	which	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	while	lacking	justification	to	believe	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p.	But	now	we	can	ask:	which	attitude	do	I	have	justification	to	adopt	towards	the	proposition	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p?	If	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	it,	then	I	have	justification	either	to	disbelieve	it	or	to	withhold	belief.	So	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	while	also	having	justification	to	disbelieve	or	to	withhold	belief	in	the	proposition	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p.	Assuming	that	justification	is	closed	under	conjunction,	it	follows	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	(1)	or	(2).	Now	consider	the	right-to-left	direction.	If	it	is	false,	then	there	is	a	possible	case	in	which	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	but	I	lack	justification	to	believe	that	p.	But	now	we	can	ask:	which	attitude	do	I	have	justification	to	adopt	towards	the	proposition	that	p?	If	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	it,	then	I	have	justification	either	to	disbelieve	it	or	to	withhold	belief.	So	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	while	also	having	justification	to	disbelieve	or	to	withhold	belief	in	the	proposition	that	p.	Assuming	that	justification	is	closed	under	conjunction,	it	follows	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	(3)	or	(4).	There	are	various	options	for	blocking	the	argument,	but	none	of	them	has	much	plausibility.	One	option	is	to	bite	the	bullet	and	insist	that	I	can	have	justified	belief	in	Moorean	conjunctions.	But	I	cannot	know	the	Moorean	conjunction	that	p	and	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	that	p,	for	if	I	know	the	first	conjunct,	then	I	have	justification	to	believe	it,	and	so	the	second	conjunct	is	false.	Moreover,	I	can	know	that	I	cannot	know	the	Moorean	conjunction.	And	it’s	not	plausible	that	I	can	have	justification	to	believe	a	proposition	that	I	can	know	I	cannot	know.	Another	option	is	to	say	that	I	can	have	justification	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions,	but	I	cannot	have	justified	belief	because	my	justification	is	finkish	in	
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the	sense	that	it	is	destroyed	in	the	act	of	trying	to	use	it.	More	specifically,	one	might	say	that	my	justification	to	believe	that	p	is	destroyed	whenever	I	disbelieve	or	withhold	belief	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	p.	But	it’s	not	plausible	that	my	justification	to	believe	that	p	is	destroyed	when	these	higher-order	attitudes	are	unjustified.	It’s	only	when	I	have	justification	for	these	higher-order	attitudes	that	my	first-order	justification	is	destroyed.	But	that’s	just	what	accessibilism	implies:	I	have	justification	to	believe	a	proposition	only	if	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	I	have	justification	to	believe	it.	So	it’s	hard	to	sustain	the	view	that	I	have	finkish	justification	for	believing	these	Moorean	conjunctions.	A	third	option	is	to	reject	the	principle	that	justification	is	closed	under	conjunction.	But	even	if	justification	does	not	always	transmit	across	a	conjunction,	as	the	preface	paradox	suggests,	it	does	not	follow	that	justification	never	transmits	across	a	conjunction.	So	the	objection	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	having	justification	to	believe	Moorean	conjunctions.	In	any	case,	one	cannot	avoid	the	charge	of	irrationality	just	by	failing	to	conjoin	one’s	beliefs	in	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction.	So,	the	argument	can	be	run	using	only	the	weaker	premise	that	one	cannot	have	justification	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction.	I	conclude	that	the	argument	for	accessibilism	is	sound.	But	is	accessibilism	a	form	of	internalism?	It	is	often	assumed	so.	Arguably,	however,	some	externalist	theories	of	justification	are	consistent	with	accessibilism.	To	illustrate	the	point,	consider	the	(admittedly	implausible)	theory	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	all	and	only	truths.8	If	it	is	true	that	p,	then	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p,	and	if	that	is	true,	then	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p,	and	so	on.	So	this	theory	of	justification	implies	accessibilism.	Arguably,	however,	it	deserves	to	be	categorized	as	an	externalist	theory	of	justification.	If	so,	then	how	should	we	understand	the	distinction	between	internalist	and	externalist	versions	of	accessibilism?	An	internalist	form	of	accessibilism	–	call	it	access	internalism	–	combines	a	privileged	access	thesis	with	a	peculiar	access	thesis.	Access	internalism	is	the	thesis																																																									8	I	owe	this	example	to	Jonathan	Jenkins	Ichikawa.	
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that	our	epistemic	access	to	facts	about	justification	is	not	only	privileged,	but	also	peculiar:	it	is	better	than	other	modes	of	epistemic	access,	but	also	different	from	other	modes	of	epistemic	access.	More	precisely,	our	epistemic	access	to	facts	about	justification	has	its	source	in	reflection	alone	–	that	is,	it	has	its	source	in	a	combination	of	introspection	and	a	priori	reasoning.	So	access	internalism	can	be	defined	as	follows:		
Access	Internalism:	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p	if	and	only	if	one	has	justification	to	believe	through	reflection	alone	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	that	p.		An	externalist	form	of	accessibilism	–	call	it	access	externalism	–	accepts	the	privileged	access	thesis	but	rejects	the	peculiar	access	thesis.	I’ll	return	to	this	distinction	between	access	internalism	and	access	externalism	in	due	course.		
3. An	Argument	for	Incompatibilism	In	sections	1	and	2,	we	saw	that	there	are	plausible	arguments	for	the	extended	cognition	thesis	and	for	accessibilism.	However,	I	will	now	argue	that	these	two	theses	are	incompatible	and	so	cannot	both	be	true:	if	accessibilism	is	true,	then	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	false,	and	vice	versa.	Here	is	the	basic	argument	for	incompatibilism:		 (1) If	accessibilism	is	true,	then	anything	that	plays	a	justifying	role	is	accessible	through	introspection.	(2) All	beliefs	play	a	justifying	role.	(3) If	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	true,	then	not	all	beliefs	are	accessible	through	introspection.	(4) Therefore,	if	accessibilism	is	true,	then	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	false.		In	sections	4-6,	I’ll	defend	each	premise	of	the	argument	against	objections,	but	I’ll	begin	by	briefly	explaining	the	motivation	for	each	premise.	
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The	rationale	for	the	first	premise	is	that	accessibilism	is	best	explained	by	access	internalism	rather	than	access	externalism.	Access	internalism	explains	our	privileged	access	to	facts	about	justification	in	terms	of	our	privileged	access	to	the	mental	facts	that	determine	them.	The	justification	facts	are	determined	by	mental	facts	that	are	accessible	through	introspection.	Moreover,	the	justification	facts	are	determined	by	mental	facts	in	accordance	with	epistemic	principles	that	are	accessible	through	a	priori	reasoning.	This	guarantees	that	the	justification	facts	are	accessible	through	reflection	alone	–	that	is,	through	a	combination	of	introspection	and	a	priori	reasoning.	The	first	premise	is	rejected	by	proponents	of	access	externalism	who	endorse	accessibilism	while	rejecting	access	internalism	(Gibbons	2006).	On	this	view,	accessibilism	can	be	true	even	if	not	everything	that	plays	a	justifying	role	is	accessible	through	introspection.	In	particular,	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	can	play	a	justifying	role	even	if	it	is	not	accessible	through	introspection.	I’ll	argue	in	section	4	that	we	need	to	endorse	access	internalism	rather	than	access	externalism	in	order	to	explain	the	truth	of	accessibilism.	The	rationale	for	the	second	premise	is	that	the	role	we	associate	with	the	ordinary	concept	of	belief	includes	its	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	All	beliefs	have	the	potential	to	justify	other	beliefs.	Not	all	beliefs	fulfill	this	potential,	since	only	justified	beliefs	justify	other	beliefs.	But	all	beliefs	have	the	potential	to	justify	other	beliefs	when	they	themselves	are	justified.	Indeed,	this	is	part	of	what	sets	beliefs	apart	from	subdoxastic	states,	which	have	no	such	potential	to	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	and	being	justified.	The	second	premise	is	rejected	by	proponents	of	strong	phenomenal	
mentalism	who	claim	that	only	conscious	experience	can	play	a	role	in	justifying	belief	(Conee	and	Feldman	2008).	On	this	view,	dispositional	beliefs	cannot	play	a	justifying	role.	So	neither	Inga’s	memory	nor	Otto’s	notebook	stores	information	in	a	way	that	plays	a	justifying	role.	I’ll	argue	in	section	5	that	this	proposal	fails	to	explain	some	key	features	of	the	epistemology	of	ordinary	reasoning.	The	rationale	for	the	third	premise	is	that	Otto’s	access	to	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook	relies	upon	perception,	rather	than	introspection.	Inga	can	
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know	that	she	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	just	by	consulting	her	memory,	whereas	Otto	has	to	open	his	notebook	and	read	it.	Therefore,	if	Otto	has	extended	beliefs	that	are	partially	constituted	by	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook,	then	those	extended	beliefs	are	not	introspectively	accessible.	The	third	premise	is	rejected	by	proponents	of	extended	introspection	who	claim	that	Otto’s	perception	of	his	notebook	constitutes	an	extended	form	of	introspection	(Clark	and	Chalmers	1998).	I’ll	argue	in	section	6	that	this	proposal	obscures	an	important	epistemic	asymmetry	between	perception	and	introspection.		
4. Access	Externalism	The	first	compatibilist	option	is	to	reject	access	internalism	in	favor	of	access	externalism.	The	term	‘access	externalism’	was	coined	by	John	Gibbons	(2006).	According	to	Gibbons’	version	of	access	externalism,	justification	supervenes	upon	what	you’re	in	a	position	to	know,	but	it	doesn’t	supervene	upon	what	you’re	in	a	position	to	know	through	reflection	alone.	If	Gibbons	is	right,	then	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	need	not	be	introspectively	accessible	in	order	to	play	a	justifying	role.	What	matters	is	that	Otto	is	in	a	position	to	know	the	contents	of	his	notebook	by	opening	and	reading	it.	If	so,	then	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook	can	play	a	justifying	role	even	if	it	is	not	accessible	to	him	through	introspection.	Gibbons	argues	against	access	internalism	by	proposing	pairs	of	subjects	who	are	alike	in	what	they	can	know	by	introspection,	but	who	differ	in	what	they	have	justification	to	believe	owing	to	differences	in	what	they	can	easily	come	to	know	by	perception.	Here	is	his	main	example:		
The	good	case:	I	have	justification	to	believe	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast	because	I	seem	to	remember	seeing	eggs	in	the	fridge	last	night.		
The	bad	case:	I	lack	justification	to	believe	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast,	although	I	seem	to	remember	seeing	eggs	in	the	fridge	last	night,	because	I	should	have	seen	the	sign	on	the	door	that	reads,	“We’re	out	of	eggs!”	
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	Gibbons	argues	that	in	the	bad	case	(1)	I	should	have	known	we’re	out	of	eggs	because	I	should	have	seen	the	note	on	the	door;	and	(2)	I	shouldn’t	believe	what	I	should	know	to	be	false;	but	(3)	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	what	I	shouldn’t	believe;	so	(4)	I	don’t	have	justification	to	believe	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast.	In	my	view,	the	argument	fails	because	it	trades	on	an	equivocation	between	different	senses	of	‘ought’	or	‘should’.9	There	is	a	subjective	sense	in	which	I	should	believe	whatever	is	supported	by	the	evidence	that	is	currently	in	my	possession.	In	the	subjective	sense,	I	should	believe	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast.	But	there	is	also	an	objective	sense	in	which	I	should	believe	whatever	is	supported	by	the	evidence	that	I	could	easily	come	to	possess	by	using	better	methods	of	gathering	evidence.	In	the	objective	sense,	I	shouldn’t	believe	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast	because	I	should	have	known	better.	Richard	Feldman	(2004)	draws	a	related	distinction	between	two	senses	of	epistemic	rationality:		 One	sort	of	epistemic	appraisal	concerns	whether	believing	a	particular	proposition	is	rational	for	a	person	at	a	time	given	exactly	the	situation	the	person	happens	to	be	in	at	the	time.	We	may	say	that	this	is	an	assessment	of	the	current-state	epistemic	rationality	of	believing	the	proposition….	A	second	possible	epistemic	evaluation	of	a	belief	has	to	do	with	the	methods	that	led	to	it.	We	may	call	this	methodological	epistemic	rationality.	(2004:	233)		As	Feldman	notes,	a	belief	can	be	rational	in	the	current-state	sense	without	being	rational	in	the	methodological	sense:	a	belief	can	be	supported	by	someone’s	current	evidence	even	if	they	possess	this	evidence	as	a	result	of	using	bad	methods.	In	the	bad	case,	my	belief	that	I’ll	have	eggs	for	breakfast	is	justified	by	the	evidence	that	is	currently	in	my	possession,	although	my	possession	of	this	evidence	results	from	insufficiently	careful	methods	of	gathering	evidence.																																																									9	The	difference	is	best	modeled	in	Kratzer’s	(1981)	semantics	by	means	of	a	distinction	between	objective	and	subjective	ways	of	ranking	options.	
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Access	internalism	is	best	construed	as	a	theory	of	epistemic	rationality	or	justification	in	the	current	state	sense,	rather	than	the	methodological	sense.	Gibbons’	argument	against	access	internalism	fails	for	this	reason.	But	we	still	need	to	ask	whether	Gibbons	is	right	to	claim	that	we	can	explain	accessibilism	without	endorsing	access	internalism.	If	so,	then	much	of	the	motivation	for	access	internalism	is	undermined.	In	section	2,	I	defined	accessibilism	as	a	biconditional	version	of	the	JJ	thesis.	Gibbons	(2006:	30)	explicitly	accepts	the	right-to-left	direction	of	the	biconditional.	He	argues	for	this	conditional	version	of	the	JJ	thesis,	as	I	have	done,	by	appealing	to	the	impermissibility	of	believing	Moorean	conjunctions:		 From	your	point	of	view,	the	question	of	whether	you	are	justified	in	believing	that	p	is	not	independent	of	the	question	of	whether	p	is	true.	If	the	questions	were	independent,	any	pair	of	answers	would	be	acceptable	in	some	situation	or	another.	But	you	should	never	believe	a	proposition	of	the	form	(p	but	I	am	not	justified	in	believing	that	p).	Nor	should	you	believe	anything	of	the	form	(p	is	false,	but	I	am	justified	in	believing	it).	(2006:	32-3)		As	we	saw	in	section	2,	however,	this	Moorean	argument	can	be	extended	to	both	directions	of	the	biconditional.	Gibbons	does	not	explicitly	accept	the	left-to-right	direction	of	the	biconditional,	but	he	comes	very	close:		 In	fact,	it	is	tempting	to	suppose	that	first-order	justification	itself	is	directly	relevant	to	the	justification	of	the	relevant	second-order	belief	if	you	form	one.	In	the	ordinary	case,	your	second-order	belief	is	justified	because	your	first-order	belief	is	justified.	(2006:	33)		As	far	as	I	can	tell,	his	only	qualm	about	the	left-to-right	direction	stems	from	not	distinguishing	sharply	enough	between	propositional	and	doxastic	justification.	If	the	topic	is	propositional	justification,	then	first-order	justification	is	sufficient	for	second-order	justification	whether	or	not	you	form	a	second-order	belief.	So	I’ll	
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continue	to	assume	that	a	satisfying	form	of	access	externalism	needs	to	explain	the	biconditional	version	of	the	JJ	thesis.	In	the	following	passage,	Gibbons	proposes	an	externalist	explanation	of	our	privileged	access	to	facts	about	justification:		 There	is	nothing	mysterious	about	combining	externalism	about	justification	with	the	sort	of	privileged	access	that	I	have	identified.	One	way	to	read	(JJ)	is	to	think	of	it	as	the	claim	that	first-order	justification	is	a	condition	for	second-order	justification.	If	any	external	facts	are	relevant	to	the	determination	of	first-order	justification,	those	very	same	facts	are	relevant	to	the	determination	of	your	second-order	justification.	(2006:	35)		The	proposal	is	that	the	JJ	thesis	is	true	because	anything	that	is	relevant	to	the	determination	of	first-order	justification	is	also	relevant	to	the	determination	of	second-order	justification	too.	If	this	is	true,	then	it	is	sufficient	to	explain	both	directions	of	the	biconditional.	But	does	Gibbons	explain	why	this	is	true?	On	Gibbons’	theory,	what	you	have	justification	to	believe	depends	upon	what	you’re	in	a	position	to	know.	In	the	bad	case,	you	have	justification	to	believe	that	you’re	out	of	eggs	because	you’re	in	a	position	to	know	that	you’re	out	of	eggs.	Does	it	follow	that	when	you’re	in	a	position	to	know	that	you’re	out	of	eggs,	you	also	have	second-order	justification	to	believe	that	you	have	first-order	justification	to	believe	that	you’re	out	of	eggs?	Not	unless	we’re	assuming	that	you’re	always	in	a	position	to	know	what	you	have	first-order	justification	to	believe.	But	that	would	be	to	assume	that	you	have	a	kind	of	privileged	access	to	facts	about	justification,	which	is	just	what	needs	to	be	explained.	So	I	conclude	that	Gibbons’	access	externalism	fails	to	explain	our	privileged	access	to	facts	about	justification.	I	don’t	claim	that	access	externalism	is	an	inconsistent	view.	But	I	do	claim	that	access	internalism	explains	our	privileged	access	to	facts	about	justification,	whereas	it	is	not	clear	how	access	externalism	can	explain	this.	I	therefore	conclude	that	we	should	reject	access	externalism	in	favor	of	access	internalism.		
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5. Strong	Phenomenal	Mentalism	The	second	compatibilist	option	is	to	deny	the	premise	that	all	beliefs	can	play	a	justifying	role	on	the	grounds	that	only	conscious	experiences	can	play	such	a	role.	On	this	view,	neither	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory	nor	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	plays	a	justifying	role.	Suppose	that	access	internalism	is	true	and	hence	that	anything	that	plays	a	justifying	role	is	accessible	through	introspection.	And	suppose	that	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	not	accessible	through	introspection	and	so	cannot	play	a	justifying	role.	This	is	no	objection	to	the	extended	mind	thesis	unless	we	accept	that	all	beliefs	can	play	a	justifying	role.	Earl	Conee	and	Richard	Feldman	(2008)	accept	a	version	of	evidentialism	on	which	one’s	evidence	determines	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe.	They	also	endorse	the	thesis	that	one’s	evidence	is	restricted	to	one’s	current	conscious	experience.	On	this	view,	only	conscious	experience	can	play	a	role	in	determining	which	propositions	one	has	justification	to	believe.	Feldman	(2004)	motivates	this	view	by	drawing	a	comparison	between	two	cases.	In	each	case,	my	friend	Jones	assures	me	that	I	can	complete	the	hike	to	Precarious	Peak,	and	I	believe	him.	In	the	first	case,	I	have	information	stored	in	memory	that	Jones	tends	to	overestimate	my	abilities.	And	in	the	second	case,	I	have	information	stored	in	my	pocket	guidebook	that	the	hike	is	suitable	only	for	expert	climbers.	So	in	both	cases	I	have	information	that	counts	against	Jones’	assurance,	but	in	one	case	it	is	stored	in	memory	and	in	the	other	case	it	is	stored	in	a	pocket	guidebook.	Moreover,	the	same	question	arises	in	each	case:	namely,	am	I	justified	in	my	belief	that	I	can	complete	the	hike	to	Precarious	Peak?	According	to	Feldman,	the	answer	is	the	same	in	each	case:	my	belief	is	justified	in	the	current-state	sense,	but	not	in	the	methodological	sense.	On	this	view,	my	belief	is	supported	by	my	current	evidence,	but	my	current	evidence	results	from	using	bad	methods	for	acquiring	evidence.	If	I	had	used	better	methods	–	say,	by	consulting	my	memory	or	by	reading	my	guidebook	–	then	I	would	have	had	evidence	that	defeats	my	justification	to	believe	that	I	can	complete	the	hike.	As	things	are,	however,	I	don’t	have	any	such	defeating	evidence.	
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On	this	view,	the	information	stored	in	my	memory	is	no	more	part	of	my	evidence	than	the	information	stored	in	my	pocket	guidebook.	This	has	clear	implications	for	the	case	of	Inga	and	Otto:	neither	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory	nor	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	suited	to	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	belief.	Feldman	considers	three	objections	to	this	proposal:	the	problem	of	stored	beliefs,	the	problem	of	forgotten	evidence,	and	the	problem	of	background	beliefs.	I’ll	argue	that	his	responses	to	these	objections	fail.	First,	the	problem	of	stored	beliefs.	You	have	beliefs	stored	in	memory	that	are	justified,	and	often	constitute	knowledge,	but	which	are	not	justified	by	anything	in	your	current	stream	of	consciousness.	Here	is	an	example	from	Feldman:		 For	example,	while	listening	to	a	philosophy	lecture	you	still	know,	and	are	justified	in	believing,	that	Washington	D.	C.	is	the	capital	of	the	United	States.	But	(presumably)	that	wasn’t	supported	by	what	you	were	thinking	of	during	the	lecture.	(2004:	236)		In	response,	Feldman	draws	a	distinction	between	occurrent	and	dispositional	senses	of	epistemic	terms,	such	as	knowledge,	justification,	or	rationality.	The	claim	is	that	my	dispositional	beliefs	constitute	dispositional	knowledge	because	their	occurrent	manifestations	would	constitute	occurrent	knowledge:		 A	person	knows	a	thing	dispositionally	provided	the	person	would	know	it	occurrently	if	he	thought	of	it.	Since	the	thought	that	Washington	is	the	capital	would,	presumably,	be	accompanied	by	an	awareness	of	justifying	evidence,	this	fact	can	be	known	dispositionally	by	most	of	us.	Hence,	the	intuition	that	we	know	simple	facts	even	when	we	are	not	thinking	of	them	can	be	accommodated	by	the	minimalist	view	of	evidence	possessed:	they	are	known	dispositionally	but	not	occurrently.	(2004:	236)		
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This	reply	commits	a	version	of	the	conditional	fallacy,	since	there	are	propositions	that	I	don’t	know	now,	although	I	would	know	them	if	I	were	to	think	of	them.	Consider,	for	example,	the	proposition	that	I’m	now	thinking	about	rhubarb.	Feldman	acknowledges	this	problem,	but	he	attempts	to	circumvent	it	by	opting	for	a	mild	form	of	skepticism	about	dispositional	knowledge:		 In	the	most	fundamental	sense,	one	does	not	know	things	such	as	that	Washington	is	the	capital	when	one	is	not	thinking	of	them.	(2004:	237)		On	this	view,	we	don’t	really	know	anything	that	we’re	not	currently	thinking	about,	although	we’re	disposed	to	have	such	knowledge	whenever	we	need	it.	One	consequence	of	this	proposal	is	that	we	cannot	explain	our	occurrent	knowledge	in	terms	of	our	dispositional	knowledge.	As	we’ll	see,	this	makes	trouble	for	Feldman’s	responses	to	other	objections.	Second,	the	problem	of	forgotten	evidence.	I	can	know	that	Washington	is	the	capital	even	if	I	have	forgotten	the	evidence	on	the	basis	of	which	I	originally	acquired	this	knowledge.	In	that	case,	there	may	be	nothing	stored	in	memory	that	would	justify	the	belief	when	it	is	brought	into	consciousness.	Feldman’s	response	is	that	my	justification	to	believe	that	Washington	is	the	capital	has	its	source	in	“my	current	conviction	or	feeling	of	certainty”	(2004:	238).	But	what	justifies	this	feeling?	Presumably,	it	stands	in	need	of	justification,	since	I	can	feel	too	strongly	convinced	that	something	is	true.	And	a	feeling	of	conviction	cannot	justify	a	belief	unless	it	is	justified.	But	it	is	not	clear	what	justifies	my	feeling	of	conviction	that	Washington	is	the	capital	without	invoking	my	dispositions	to	feel	certainty	or	conviction	about	other	things.	This	threatens	to	undermine	Feldman’s	proposal	because	he	is	committed	to	denying	that	occurrent	knowledge	is	explained	in	terms	of	dispositional	knowledge.	Third,	the	problem	of	background	beliefs.	If	my	justifying	evidence	is	exhausted	by	my	current	experience,	then	how	do	we	account	for	the	epistemic	role	of	background	beliefs?	In	Feldman’s	example,	an	expert	and	a	novice	see	a	scarlet	tanager	and	it	looks	the	same	way	to	each	of	them.	The	expert	comes	to	believe	that	
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it’s	a	scarlet	tanager	because	she	has	the	background	knowledge	that	scarlet	tanagers	look	that	way.	Meanwhile,	the	novice	leaps	to	the	conclusion	that	it’s	a	scarlet	tanager	on	the	basis	of	her	knowledge	that	scarlet	tanagers	have	once	been	spotted	here	before.	In	this	case,	the	expert	and	the	novice	have	just	the	same	experiences,	but	only	the	expert	knows	that	it’s	a	scarlet	tanager.	Moreover,	it’s	hard	to	explain	this	without	invoking	background	knowledge.	As	Feldman	acknowledges,	it	would	be	implausible	to	maintain	that	the	expert	cannot	know	that	it’s	a	scarlet	tanager	unless	she	brings	her	background	knowledge	into	consciousness.	There	is	no	need	for	the	expert	to	make	the	inference	consciously	once	it	has	become	automatic.	Instead,	Feldman	appeals	to	the	expert’s	feelings	of	certainty	that	it’s	a	scarlet	tanager.	The	problem	is	that	the	novice	can	have	these	feelings	too,	although	they’re	not	justified	in	his	case.	So	it’s	difficult	to	explain	the	difference	in	epistemic	standing	between	the	expert	and	the	novice	without	appealing	to	the	epistemic	role	of	background	beliefs.10	The	upshot	is	that	we	cannot	plausibly	restrict	one’s	evidence	to	one’s	current	conscious	experience.	One’s	dispositional	beliefs	also	play	a	justifying	role.	But	given	access	internalism,	they	can	play	this	role	only	if	they	are	accessible	through	introspection.	The	problem	for	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	that	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	does	not	seem	to	satisfy	this	condition.		
6. Extended	Introspection	The	third	compatibilist	option	is	to	argue	that	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	accessible	to	him	through	introspection.	Clark	and	Chalmers	take	this	line	in	response	to	an	objection	to	the	parity	argument.	The	objection	is	that	there	is	a	disparity	between	Inga	and	Otto	because	Inga’s	access	to	her	memory	relies	upon	introspection,	whereas	Otto’s	access	to	his	notebook	relies	upon	perception.	Clark	and	Chalmers	reply	that	this	objection	begs	the	question:																																																										10	Feldman	(2004:	239)	considers	a	reply	that	concedes	this	point.	On	this	view,	one’s	evidence	includes	not	only	conscious	experience,	but	also	background	beliefs	that	are	currently	operative	in	causing	one’s	current	experience.	
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Otto’s	internal	processes	and	his	notebook	constitute	a	single	cognitive	system.	From	the	standpoint	of	this	system,	the	flow	of	information	between	notebook	and	brain	is	not	perceptual	at	all;	it	does	not	involve	the	impact	of	something	outside	the	system.	It	is	more	akin	to	information	flow	within	the	brain.	(1998:	16)		Presumably,	Clark	and	Chalmers	do	not	mean	to	deny	that	Otto	perceives	his	notebook.	That	would	be	hard	to	swallow.	A	more	charitable	interpretation	is	that	Otto’s	perception	of	the	notebook	constitutes	an	extended	form	of	introspection,	since	it	enables	him	to	know	the	contents	of	his	extended	beliefs.	The	objection	begs	the	question	by	assuming	that	if	Otto’s	access	to	the	notebook	involves	perception,	then	it	cannot	also	constitute	an	extended	process	of	introspection.11	In	some	ways,	this	reply	is	too	quick.	Not	all	knowledge	of	one’s	beliefs	counts	as	introspective	knowledge	–	for	example,	knowledge	that	is	acquired	through	the	expert	testimony	of	a	therapist.	So	even	if	we	assume	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	Otto	believes	the	contents	of	his	notebook,	it	doesn’t	follow	that	his	perception	of	the	notebook	constitutes	a	form	of	introspection.	Still,	it	remains	an	open	question	whether	Otto’s	perception	of	the	notebook	constitutes	an	extended	form	of	introspection	of	his	beliefs.	We	need	an	argument	to	settle	the	question.	Brie	Gertler	argues	for	a	negative	answer.	She	begins	by	noting	that	introspection	is	an	exclusively	first-personal	way	of	acquiring	knowledge:	“it	reveals	only	the	introspector’s	own	states,	and	not	the	states	of	others”	(2007:	194).	Next,	she	argues	that	Otto’s	way	of	acquiring	knowledge	of	his	beliefs	through	perception	of	his	notebook	does	not	satisfy	this	condition.	After	all,	Otto’s	friend	can	figure	out	what	Otto	believes	by	reading	his	notebook	in	much	the	same	way	that	Otto	can.	Thus,	she	writes:		 When	Otto	tries	to	figure	out	what	he	believes	on	a	particular	topic,	he	consults	the	notebook.	For	instance,	suppose	that	he	wonders	what	he																																																									11	See	also	Carter	and	Palermos	2015:	760	for	a	similar	point.	
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believes	about	the	location	of	the	MoMA.	He	will	look	in	the	notebook	and	conclude:	I	believe	that	the	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	But	of	course	someone	other	than	Otto	can	determine	Otto’s	beliefs	in	precisely	the	same	way:	by	consulting	the	notebook,	a	friend	can	determine	that	Otto	believes	that	the	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	(2007:	194)		On	the	basis	of	this	argument,	Gertler	concludes	that	Otto	cannot	acquire	introspective	knowledge	of	his	beliefs	by	perceiving	the	notebook.	One	might	question	Gertler’s	assumption	we	have	some	exclusively	first-personal	way	of	knowing	about	our	beliefs.	For	instance,	Clark	argues	that	it	is	a	purely	contingent	fact	that	other	people	cannot	know	what	Inga	believes	by	accessing	her	stored	memories:		 But	why	suppose	that	uniqueness	of	access	is	anything	more	than	a	contingent	fact	about	standard	biological	recall?	If,	in	the	future,	science	devised	a	way	for	you	to	occasionally	tap	into	my	stored	memories,	would	that	make	them	any	less	mine,	or	part	of	my	cognitive	apparatus?	(2010:	57)		As	far	as	I	can	see,	however,	this	objection	misses	the	mark.	Gertler	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	other	people	can	know	what	I	believe	by	accessing	my	memories.	What	she	rules	out	is	the	possibility	that	they	can	know	what	I	believe	by	means	of	introspection.	The	futuristic	possibility	that	Clark	describes	is	one	in	which	other	people	know	what	I	believe	by	a	novel	form	of	perception,	such	as	telepathy,	rather	than	by	introspection.	A	more	promising	objection	targets	Gertler’s	assumption	that	Otto’s	friend	can	know	what	Otto	believes	in	the	same	way	that	Otto	can.	If	we’re	assuming	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	as	Inga’s	memory,	then	Otto	can	know	what	he	believes	non-inferentially	on	the	basis	of	perception	of	the	notebook.	Otto’s	friend,	in	contrast,	cannot	know	that	Otto	believes	what	is	written	in	his	notebook	without	making	an	inference	that	relies	on	the	background	belief	that	the	notebook	plays	the	
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right	kind	of	role	in	Otto’s	psychology.	Arguably,	then,	Otto’s	way	of	knowing	what	he	believes	is	exclusively	first-personal.	I	propose	a	different	argument	for	the	conclusion	that	Otto	cannot	acquire	introspective	knowledge	of	his	beliefs	by	perceiving	the	notebook.	Gertler’s	argument	relies	on	the	claim	that	introspection	is	peculiar	in	the	sense	that	it	is	different	from	other	ways	of	knowing	about	the	world.	In	contrast,	my	argument	relies	on	the	claim	that	introspection	is	privileged	in	the	sense	that	it	is	epistemically	more	secure	than	other	ways	of	knowing	about	the	world.	However,	the	relevant	notion	of	epistemic	privilege	needs	to	be	spelled	out	with	care.	I	don’t	claim	that	Inga’s	access	to	her	memory	is	more	reliable	than	Otto’s	access	to	his	notebook.	It	is	true	that	Otto	could	go	temporarily	blind	or	he	could	suffer	from	occasional	visual	illusions	or	hallucinations	that	lead	him	to	misread	the	contents	of	the	notebook.	These	cases	must	be	the	exception,	rather	than	the	rule,	since	the	contents	of	the	notebook	do	not	constitute	Otto’s	beliefs	unless	he	has	sufficiently	reliable	access	to	them.	By	the	same	token,	however,	Inga	could	suffer	problems	that	prevent	her	from	correctly	retrieving	information	that	is	stored	in	memory.	As	Clark	and	Chalmers	write:		 Otto’s	access	to	the	notebook	is	very	reliable	–	not	perfectly	reliable,	to	be	sure,	but	then	neither	is	Inga’s	access	to	her	memory.	A	surgeon	might	tamper	with	her	brain,	or	more	mundanely,	she	might	have	too	much	to	drink.	(1998:	15)		So	we	can	stipulate	that	there	is	approximate	parity	between	Inga	and	Otto	with	respect	to	reliability	of	access.	In	my	view,	the	epistemic	difference	between	Inga	and	Otto	is	best	described	in	terms	of	rationality,	rather	than	reliability.	Even	if	we	stipulate	that	Inga	and	Otto	are	equally	reliable,	we	do	not	thereby	ensure	that	they	are	equally	rational.	And	this	is	because	Otto’s	misperceptions	of	the	notebook	need	not	constitute	any	failure	of	rationality,	whereas	Inga’s	memory	lapses	do.	Let	me	explain.	
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First,	why	should	we	think	that	Inga’s	failure	to	access	the	information	stored	in	memory	constitutes	a	failure	of	rationality?	Suppose	Inga	has	the	information	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	stored	in	memory,	although	she	fails	to	access	the	information	on	this	occasion	because	of	an	error	in	retrieval.	And	suppose	that	Inga	tries	to	answer	the	question	whether	she	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	by	using	the	procedure	described	below	by	Gareth	Evans:		 I	get	myself	in	a	position	to	answer	the	question	whether	I	believe	that	p	by	putting	into	operation	whatever	procedure	I	have	for	answering	the	question	whether	p.	(Evans	1982:	225)		Using	Evans’	procedure	leads	her	to	believe	that	she	doesn’t	believe	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	Now	she	is	in	the	Moorean	predicament	of	believing	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St,	while	believing	that	she	doesn’t	believe	this.	But	this	is	an	irrational	predicament.	After	all,	if	she	conjoins	these	beliefs,	then	she	believes	the	Moorean	conjunction	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	and	I	don’t	believe	it	is.	Moreover,	she	cannot	avoid	rational	criticism	just	by	failing	to	conjoin	her	beliefs.	If	it’s	not	rational	to	believe	a	Moorean	conjunction,	then	it’s	not	rational	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of		Moorean	conjunction.	To	be	sure,	believing	a	Moorean	conjunction	is	more	egregiously	irrational	than	believing	each	of	its	conjuncts,	just	as	believing	an	explicit	contradiction	is	more	egregiously	irrational	than	believing	each	of	its	conjuncts.	But	believing	the	conjuncts	of	a	Moorean	conjunction	is	no	more	immune	from	rational	criticism	than	believing	the	conjuncts	of	an	explicit	contradiction.12	Second,	why	not	think	that	Otto’s	failure	to	access	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook	constitutes	a	failure	of	rationality?	Suppose	Otto	has	the	information	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	stored	in	his	notebook,	although	he	fails	to	access	the	information	on	this	occasion	because	he	has	a	visual	illusion	in	which	the	notebook	appears	to	say	that	MoMA	is	on	51st	St.	Using	Evans’	procedure	leads	him	to	believe	that	he	does	not	believe	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	According	to	the	extended																																																									12	See	Smithies	2016	for	a	more	extended	discussion	of	Moore’s	paradox	and	its	implications	for	an	account	of	our	introspective	knowledge	of	standing	belief.	
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cognition	thesis,	he	is	now	in	the	Moorean	predicament	of	believing	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St,	while	believing	that	he	doesn’t	believe	this.	So	the	extended	cognition	thesis	predicts	that	Otto	is	irrational.	But	it’s	implausible	to	suppose	that	Otto	is	irrational	just	by	virtue	of	misperceiving	his	notebook.	Compare	Stewart	Cohen’s	(1984)	new	evil	demon	problem	for	reliabilism:	a	victim	of	a	Cartesian	evil	demon	can	be	fully	rational	even	if	their	perceptual	experiences	systematically	misrepresent	the	environment.	Similarly,	Otto	can	be	fully	rational	even	if	his	perceptual	experiences	occasionally	misrepresent	the	contents	of	his	notebook.	In	general,	perceptual	error	is	not	sufficient	for	rational	error.	In	summary,	a	proponent	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	cannot	respect	both	of	the	following	plausible	principles	about	rationality:		 (1) Pryor’s	principle:	if	you’re	rational,	and	it	perceptually	seems	to	you	that	p,	and	there	are	no	defeaters,	then	you	believe	that	p.	(Pryor	2000:	532)	(2) Shoemaker’s	principle:	if	you’re	rational,	and	you	believe	that	p,	and	you	consider	whether	you	believe	that	p,	then	you	believe	that	you	believe	that	p.	(Shoemaker	1996:	83,	241-2)		These	principles	conflict	in	the	case	that	Otto	misperceives	his	notebook	as	saying	that	MoMA	is	on	51st	St.	According	to	Pryor’s	principle,	it’s	rational	for	Otto	to	believe	that	his	notebook	says	MoMA	is	on	51st	St,	rather	than	53rd	St.	If	he’s	rational,	then	Otto	can	use	Evans’	procedure	in	coming	to	rationally	believe	that	he	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	51st	St,	rather	than	53rd	St.	And	yet,	by	hypothesis,	he	believes	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St.	According	to	Shoemaker’s	principle,	it’s	not	rational	for	Otto	to	believe	that	MoMA	is	on	53rd	St	while	believing	that	he	does	not	believe	this.	So	the	two	principles	come	into	conflict.	A	proponent	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	might	argue	for	epistemic	parity	between	Inga	and	Otto	by	appealing	to	a	perceptual	model	of	introspection.	On	a	perceptual	model	of	introspection,	there	is	no	relevant	epistemological	disparity	between	Inga’s	introspective	access	to	her	memory	and	Otto’s	perceptual	access	to	his	notebook.	However,	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection	should	be	
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rejected	precisely	because	it	obscures	the	epistemological	differences	between	perception	and	introspection.	Here	is	an	argument	to	that	effect:		 (1) If	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection	is	true,	then	introspection	is	vulnerable	to	brute	error:	there	can	be	introspectively	justified	false	beliefs	about	one’s	beliefs.	(2) But	introspection	is	immune	from	brute	error:	there	cannot	be	introspectively	justified	false	beliefs	about	one’s	beliefs.	(3) Therefore,	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection	is	false.		The	rationale	for	premise	(1)	is	that	perception	is	vulnerable	to	brute	errors	in	which	one	forms	justified	false	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	perceptual	representations	that	misrepresent	the	world.	The	rationale	for	premise	(2)	is	that	if	introspection	is	vulnerable	to	brute	error,	then	there	can	be	justified	Moorean	beliefs	of	the	form,	p	
and	I	don’t	believe	that	p.	Since	there	cannot	be	justified	Moorean	beliefs	of	this	form,	there	cannot	be	brute	error	in	the	case	of	introspection,	and	so	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection	is	false.13	In	conclusion,	there	is	an	important	epistemic	disparity	between	Inga	and	Otto.	Inga’s	introspective	access	to	her	memory	is	immune	from	brute	error,	whereas	Otto’s	perceptual	access	to	his	notebook	is	vulnerable	to	brute	error.	The	claim	is	not	that	Inga’s	introspective	access	to	her	memory	is	more	reliable	than	Otto’s	perceptual	access	to	his	notebook.	There	can	be	errors	in	memory	retrieval	just	as	there	can	be	errors	in	perceptual	representation.	The	difference	is	that	errors	in	memory	retrieval	constitute	failures	of	rationality,	whereas	errors	in	perceptual	representation	do	not.	The	extended	cognition	thesis	obscures	this	epistemic	disparity	between	perception	and	introspection.		
																																																								13	See	also	Shoemaker	1996:	Ch.	2	&	11	and	Burge	1996	for	arguments	against	the	perceptual	model	of	introspection.	The	term	‘brute	error’	is	from	Burge	1996,	although	I	define	it	slightly	differently	from	him.	
	 29	
7. The	Argument	from	Disparity	In	sections	1	and	2,	we	saw	that	there	are	plausible	arguments	for	the	extended	cognition	thesis	and	for	accessibilism.	In	section	3,	however,	we	saw	an	argument	that	these	two	positions	are	incompatible,	and	I	defended	the	premises	of	this	argument	in	sections	4-6.	If	the	argument	for	incompatibilism	is	sound,	then	we	cannot	accept	both	accessibilism	and	the	extended	cognition	thesis.	Since	I	am	persuaded	by	the	Moorean	argument	for	accessibilism,	I	am	thereby	committed	to	rejecting	the	extended	cognition	thesis.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	discharge	the	burden	of	explaining	where	the	argument	from	parity	goes	wrong.	I	claim	that	the	third	premise	of	the	parity	argument	is	false.	This	premise	states	that	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	plays	the	same	role	as	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory.	But	in	fact	there	is	a	crucial	disparity	between	Inga	and	Otto	–	namely,	that	Inga	has	access	to	the	information	stored	in	her	memory	though	introspection,	whereas	Otto	has	access	to	the	information	stored	in	his	notebook	through	perception.	Moreover,	this	is	not	a	merely	superficial	difference.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	deep	enough	to	ground	a	cognitive	difference	between	Inga	and	Otto.	I’ve	argued	that	the	functional	role	of	belief	includes	its	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	And	I’ve	argued	that	if	access	internalism	is	true,	then	beliefs	can	play	this	justifying	role	only	if	they	are	accessible	through	introspection.	Since	the	information	stored	in	Inga’s	memory	is	accessible	through	introspection,	it	can	play	the	justifying	role	that	is	required	for	belief.	In	contrast,	the	information	stored	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	accessible	through	perception,	rather	than	introspection,	so	it	cannot	play	the	justifying	role	required	for	constituting	belief.	The	upshot	is	that	we	can	give	an	argument	from	disparity	for	the	conclusion	that	Otto’s	notebook,	unlike	Inga’s	memory,	does	not	constitute	beliefs:		 (1) Everything	that	plays	a	justifying	role	is	accessible	through	introspection.	(2) All	beliefs	play	a	justifying	role.	(3) The	information	in	Otto’s	notebook	is	not	accessible	though	introspection.	(4) Therefore,	Otto	does	not	believe	the	information	in	his	notebook.	
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	As	we	have	seen,	proponents	of	access	externalism	reject	premise	(1),	while	proponents	of	strong	phenomenal	mentalism	reject	premise	(2),	and	proponents	of	extended	introspection	reject	premise	(3).	But	having	defended	all	three	premises	against	objections,	I	conclude	that	we	should	accept	the	conclusion	(4).	The	parity	argument	fails,	and	the	disparity	argument	succeeds,	because	extended	states	do	not	satisfy	the	parity	principle.	According	to	the	parity	principle,	anything	that	plays	the	same	role	as	belief	is	itself	a	belief.	This	principle	is	motivated	by	a	broadly	functionalist	conception	of	the	mind	on	which	belief	is	realized	by	information	that	plays	the	right	kind	of	role	in	the	subject’s	psychology.	But	what	exactly	counts	as	the	right	kind	of	role?	Different	versions	of	functionalism	give	different	answers	to	this	question.	Clark	and	Chalmers	emphasize	the	causal-explanatory	role	of	belief.	They	argue	that	extended	states	can	function	much	like	beliefs	in	the	causal	explanation	of	behavior.	On	this	basis,	they	conclude	that	extended	states	are	beliefs.	But	their	argument	assumes	that	the	role	of	belief	is	exhausted	by	its	causal-explanatory	role.	Here	is	a	representative	passage	from	a	recent	discussion	by	Chalmers:		 The	deeper	point	is	that	extended	states	can	function	in	explanation	in	very	much	the	same	way	that	beliefs	function,	and	should	be	regarded	as	sharing	a	deep	and	important	explanatory	kind	with	them.	This	explanatory	unification	is	the	real	underlying	point	of	the	extended	mind	thesis.	(Chalmers	2011:	xiv)		A	key	point	that	goes	missing	in	Clark	and	Chalmers’s	discussion	is	that	the	functional	role	of	belief	is	not	exhausted	by	its	causal	role	in	explaining	behavior,	but	also	includes	its	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	Given	access	internalism,	beliefs	must	be	accessible	through	introspection	in	order	to	play	this	justifying	role.	But	since	Otto’s	extended	states	are	not	accessible	through	introspection,	they	cannot	play	a	justifying	role.	Therefore,	Otto’s	extended	states	should	not	be	counted	as	beliefs,	even	if	they	play	an	explanatory	role	that	is	otherwise	similar	to	the	explanatory	role	of	belief.	
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The	more	general	moral	is	that	commonsense	functionalism	about	belief	is	best	construed	as	normative	functionalism,	rather	than	merely	causal	functionalism.	In	other	words,	belief	should	be	defined	in	terms	of	normative	as	well	as	merely	causal	aspects	of	its	functional	role.	After	all,	commonsense	psychology	is	not	a	purely	causal	theory.	It	is	also	a	normative	theory	of	what	justifies	what.	This	is	one	way	in	which	our	commonsense	theory	of	mind	is	different	from	other	scientific	theories.	A	functionalist	theory	of	belief	that	highlights	its	causal	role	at	the	expense	of	its	normative	role	thereby	ignores	what	is	most	distinctive	to	our	commonsense	understanding	(as	opposed	to	a	purely	scientific	understanding)	of	the	mind.	Why	have	so	many	philosophers	emphasized	the	causal	role	of	belief	at	the	expense	of	its	normative	role	in	developing	functionalist	theories	of	mind?	Much	of	the	impetus	comes	from	a	program	of	naturalistic	reduction.	Causation	is	thought	to	be	more	amenable	to	reduction	than	normativity	and	so	better	suited	to	giving	a	reductionist	definition	of	mental	states.	But	if	the	program	of	naturalistic	reduction	is	to	be	successful,	then	it	needs	to	encompass	normativity	as	well	as	causation.	So	the	program	of	naturalistic	reduction	provides	no	principled	rationale	for	defining	beliefs	and	other	mental	states	in	terms	of	purely	causal	rather	than	normative	aspects	of	their	functional	role.	I	conclude	that	the	extended	cognition	thesis	should	be	rejected	on	broadly	epistemological	grounds.	And	I	put	this	forward	as	just	one	example	of	the	way	in	which	epistemology	can	and	should	constrain	our	understanding	of	the	mind.		
8. Conclusions	In	this	chapter,	I	have	argued	that	we	should	reject	the	extended	cognition	thesis	on	epistemological	grounds.	I	close	with	some	clarifications	and	concessions.	First,	I	have	argued	that	Otto’s	extended	states	are	not	beliefs	because	they	are	not	accessible	through	introspection	and	so	they	cannot	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	But	this	is	consistent	with	Clark	and	Chalmers’	claim	that	extended	states	play	a	role	in	the	causal	explanation	of	behavior	that	is	otherwise	similar	to	the	role	of	belief.	So	we	might	concede	that	extended	states	can	play	some	but	not	all	of	the	functional	roles	that	we	associate	with	our	concept	of	belief.	
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Second,	my	discussion	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	is	exclusively	concerned	with	doxastic	states	and	processes,	as	distinct	from	the	subdoxastic	states	and	processes	that	figure	in	computational	explanations	in	cognitive	science.	My	discussion	has	no	implications	for	a	version	of	the	extended	cognition	thesis	that	concerns	subdoxastic	states	and	processes,	since	they	are	not	subject	to	epistemic	evaluation	and	they	do	not	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	belief.	Finally,	I	do	not	deny	the	possibility	of	science-fiction	scenarios	in	which	beliefs	are	realized	outside	the	skull.	What	I	deny	is	that	beliefs	are	realized	outside	the	skull	just	by	playing	the	kind	of	role	that	Otto’s	notebook	plays.	Otto’s	notebook	does	not	realize	beliefs	because	its	contents	are	accessible	by	perception,	rather	than	introspection,	and	so	they	cannot	play	an	epistemic	role	in	justifying	other	beliefs.	Introspective	access	usually	coincides	with	intracranial	location,	but	the	two	can	come	apart:	in	science	fiction	scenarios,	there	can	be	introspective	access	to	extracranial	states	and	perceptual	access	to	intracranial	states.	To	that	extent,	I	am	in	full	agreement	with	Clark	and	Chalmers	that	“when	it	comes	to	belief,	there	is	nothing	sacred	about	skull	and	skin”	(1998:	14).		
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